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Abstract. Since the creation of the United Nations, the ban of the use of force has 
been collectively viewed as a founding principle of relations between states. 
However, the end of the Cold War and the strengthening of multilateral 
international institutions’ role in conflict management has not resulted in a general 
and lasting commitment to the traditional principles of collective security. The use 
of force has been states' most evident strategy, but it is not the only approach. 
Actually, conflict prevention has been investigated outside the spotlight by 
academic circles, international organisations, and governmental institutions as an 
alternative option for the management of crisis situations. Conflict prevention is 
neither a new policy nor a new technical tool for avoiding war. Rather, it is a 
different approach to using existing tools of conflict management, and employing 
early warning systems. This paper investigates the development of the early 
warning concept and its application to the sphere of conflict management. 
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Introduction 
Since the creation of the United Nations, the ban of the use of force has been 
collectively viewed as one of the founding principles of the relations between states, as 
regulated in the UN Charter. Although war has continued, international community 
rules have never been as openly challenged as they are today. The bipolar order 
established together with the new organisation of international relations helped 
stigmatise global war. However, it certainly distorted the significance of the collective 
rules of international behaviour in many ways, especially with regard to conflict 
management within each superpower’s sphere of influence. The end of the Cold War 
and the strengthening of multilateral international institutions’ role in conflict 
management did not result in a general and lasting commitment to the traditional 
principles of collective security. On the contrary, in the face of the changing nature and 
scope of conflicts, the international community proved unable to act coherently with 
those principles and could not avoid recourse to “muscular” strategies. Today, 
especially as a consequence of 11 September 2001, a complete change of perspective 
regarding the use of force seems to have occurred so as to include military means 
among the ordinary instruments of conflict management and resolution.  
 However, although it is the most evident, this is not the only approach adopted by 
the international community in the face of the many and complex security challenges 
with which it must deal today. Actually, since the very beginning of the 1990s, conflict 
prevention has been investigated outside the spotlight by academic circles, international 
organisations, and governmental institutions as an alternative option for the 
management of crisis situations. Today, notwithstanding the current prevalence of 
military means in the panorama of international relations, it is not utopian to talk about 
conflict prevention and the instruments for accomplishing it. These last few years have 
in fact witnessed significant efforts to effectively translate theoretical discourses on 
conflict prevention into the practice of intergovernmental organisations, governments 
and NGOs. The mainstreaming of conflict prevention within the ordinary activities of 
these international bodies is becoming a real, although silent, trend that, in a not too 
distant future, could seriously challenge the current attitude towards the management of 
conflicts. For this to be accomplished, however, conflict prevention must be understood 
in its entirety. Conflict prevention is neither a new policy nor a new technical tool for 
avoiding war, rather it is a different approach to using existing tools of conflict 
management. In order to be effective, that is to ensure the prevention of potential 
conflicts escalating into open violence, a preliminary understanding of the whole crisis 
situation and an assessment of the best available preventive measures are needed, 
through the employment of early warning systems. 
Though less popular than conflict prevention, early warning is of vital importance 
for conflict prevention itself, as it is its essential prerequisite. Initially associated with 
the issuing of warning signals regarding an impending escalation of conflict, early 
warning systems have developed into comprehensive instruments that are able to 
significantly influence the effectiveness of preventive strategies. Today’s early warning 
encompasses different activities ranging from collecting information to anticipating 
conflict events but also, and especially, suggesting the most appropriate policy options 
for preventing conflict outbursts. Early warning has become the focal point for policy 
makers seeking practical instruments for preventive intervention, and is currently 
undergoing significant scrutiny. Its proponents insist that it contribute to conflict 
prevention decision making. For them the feasibility debate focuses almost exclusively 
on bridging the gap between early warning and early action, by providing those 
responsible for the implementation of conflict prevention with the most effective 
preventive strategies for each potential conflict. 
This paper investigates the development of the early warning concept and its 
application to the sphere of conflict management. In particular, the intimate connection 
between early warning and conflict prevention is analysed, along with the evolution of 
conflict early warning from the simple issuing of a warning signal to the interpretation 
of conflict-related information in order to propose appropriate courses of action. This 
preliminary investigation on the nature of early warning, coupled with a brief 
discussion on the application of econometric techniques to political forecasting, will 
allow a better understanding of the current discussion on both the theory and practice 
of conflict early warning.  
 1. The Origins of Early Warning: from Intelligence and Disaster Preparedness to 
Conflict Early Warning 
Early warning systems have long been used in government intelligence, and for natural 
disasters such as floods, hurricanes, volcanoes and earthquakes and their effects on 
people.  
For the purposes of the Cold War, intelligence early warning systems were 
designed to enable the deterrence of an enemy’s threat or the mitigation of its effects. 
They were used with a preemptive aim: advance notification of an imminent hostile act 
by the enemy allowed for preventive action, which could deter or even compel the 
enemy to cancel its planned action. For the superpowers, early warning mechanisms 
were useful as a trip-wire, activated whenever a dispute threatened to undermine 
international stability. In the context of nuclear weapons, early warning systems 
referred to technologies able to trace hostile nuclear attacks in time, based on satellite 
information. In fact, these systems were suited to prevent those nuclear interstate 
conflicts seen as the only possible threat to the East - West geopolitical order. The 
bipolar arrangement ensured that states’ internal conflicts were suppressed in the 
interest of bloc unity. Bloc-based mechanisms and policies were also in place in order 
to contain intrastate conflicts through external actions [1].  
Early warning was applied to natural disasters as early as the 1880s in India and 
the 1920s in Sudan, when the British introduced an information system for the timely 
prediction of food shortages. The African famines of the 1970s and 1980s stimulated 
interest in early warning systems for developing nutritional security strategies, resulting 
in the creation of early warning systems to predict climatic changes, droughts, famine 
and the following flow of refugees [2]. It was the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) which developed the first early warning system not for self-defense: the Global 
Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) was established in 1975 in order to 
provide policymakers and policy analysts with the most accurate and up-to-date 
information available on all aspects of food supply and demand. Such a system warns 
of imminent food crises, thus enabling the FAO to stockpile and locate food supplies to 
prevent famine [3].  
In 1981, a study for the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR), aimed at 
enabling the UN to prepare for and mitigate the causes of forced migration, 
recommended the creation of an early warning system within the UN to study and track 
the factors contributing to forced migration. Within this context, the UN Humanitarian 
Early Warning System (HEWS) was conceived in the late 1980s, with the objective of 
anticipating the refugee flows so that shelter, water and food supplies could be in place 
to mitigate the suffering of refugees, and preventive action could be taken to alleviate 
the causes which stimulated such flows [4]. More recently, in 1992 the UNHCR 
working group on international protection stressed that early warning was appropriate 
for specific UNHCR initiatives[5]. The UNHCR developed a matrix of parameters for 
monitoring country level situations relating to the forced migration of people, whereby 
obtaining analyses to communicate via regular and structured reports to decision-
makers[6]. 
It is in the sphere of international humanitarian policies that the contemporary 
conception of early warning for anticipating violent conflicts has its roots, namely in an 
attempt to identify situations enough in advance to change the conditions that could 
 provoke a violent conflict1. In this case early warning was eventually considered not 
only as an analytical forecasting tool for identifying the likelihood of specified events 
or conditions in certain locations, but also a proper preventive tool. Its primary function 
is not to simply predict humanitarian disasters, including conflicts, but rather to alert 
policymakers and highlight what to change, in order to prevent such disasters [7].  
Such an interest in the preventive faculties of early warning is a result of the 
epochal changes brought forth by the end of the Cold War and the ensuing shift of 
global security perceptions. In fact, the considerable number of violent conflicts, 
mostly within states, which erupted after the bipolar order's collapse2, and the growing 
awareness that it may be easier to tackle crises early before they reach the point of 
armed conflict or mass violence, produced an attention shift from conflict resolution to 
conflict prevention. A deeper consciousness about the need for conflict prevention 
reverberated through the international community after the failures of muscular 
peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, which 
revealed the great difficulties in overcoming inaction and competition among great 
powers in a multipolar international system. Prevention was needed, if not out of moral 
obligation, at least for its cost-effectiveness when compared to excessive bills for 
subsequent relief, protection and reconstruction after conflicts. Furthermore, the new 
preoccupation with prevention was also a response to the globalisation of contemporary 
conflicts, which not only had causes related to the global system but also had global 
effects, through media coverage, refugee flows, the impact of diasporas and the 
destabilisation of surrounding regions [8]. 
Eventually, in the late 1990s, the turbulence that accompanied the end of the Cold 
War was partially contained. The increase in the number of conflicts culminated 
leading up to 1992, but since then there has been a slow but gradual decline. Three 
major positive trends have resulted from the enhanced efforts and increased resources 
used in managing and resolving conflicts, especially by the international organisations 
and NGOs that had been consigned to a marginal role during the Cold War. First, the 
decrease by nearly 50% in the number and magnitude of armed conflicts within and 
among states that has started since the early 1990s is persisting, and few of the many 
societal wars contained in the last decade have resumed; second, conflicts over self-
determination are being settled with greater frequency, thus continuing to decline to 
their lowest level since 1960; third, most democratic regimes established in the 1980s 
and ‘90s have endured, despite political and economic crises, with the consequence that 
democratic governments outnumber autocratic governments [9]. Within this optimistic 
scenario, what is today worthy of greater attention is the chronic war proneness of 
certain countries like many in Africa, which experienced much conflict during the last 
twenty years of the Cold War and throughout the 1990s [10]. A recent survey of trends 
from 1946 to 2000 found that “for the last half century at least, societies at low levels 
of development have suffered much more from societal warfare than prosperous 
societies. […] Poor societies are at risk of falling into no-exit cycles of conflict in 
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warning's main objective is to anticipate the enemy’s moves in order to change behaviour accordingly; 
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2
 The Cold War formula of maintaining a global balance of power also affected intrastate conflicts. These 
were in fact contained and controlled in order to keep “the system” steady. Intrastate conflicts that erupted 
after of the collapse of the bipolar order had often been managed but not yet resolved. See further [12]. 
 which ineffective governance, societal warfare, humanitarian crises, and lack of 
development perpetually chase one another” [11]. However, the link between poverty 
and violence is not direct. In fact, many poor countries have traditionally avoided 
violent conflicts. Thus, if it is true that poverty increases a society’s proneness to war, 
it is also true that developing countries characterised by transitional or incoherent 
policies, weak institutions, horizontal inequalities and relative deprivation among 
groups are frequently affected by violent conflict [11]. These are the countries that are 
destined to continue experiencing serious wars unless global strategies for the 
prevention of violent conflicts are systematically implemented in the immediate future. 
Conflict early warning is more problematic than early warning in intelligence and 
natural disasters. In fact, the uncertainty stemming from dealing with societies, which 
are complex and open systems that cannot be precisely described (neither according to 
status nor development), affects a system's ability to make an exact early warning 
prognosis. An additional problem, which contributes to making prediction ever more 
difficult, is that a society with a potential for conflict is sensitive to factors that would 
have no effect on a balanced system. Eventually, any prediction becomes impossible 
when conflict is imminent and the system is completely off-balance. As long as a 
society is relatively stable, the upper and lower spectrums of the probability of certain 
events leading to other identified events are rather well-defined. The more off-balance 
the system becomes, the more potential sequences can increase or can eventually no 
longer be determined, since an initial situation S1 can lead to S2, S3, or in the end to Sn 
[13]. This means that for a forecast to be as accurate as possible, it needs to be early, 
before any succession of events is impossible to determine. 
2. Early Warning and Conflict Prevention 
The rationale for having effective conflict early warning systems lies essentially in the 
intimate connection between early warning and conflict prevention. Early warning is 
closely tied to conflict prevention as it is its essential prerequisite. Only if warned about 
both the structural weakness and current tense situation existing in a certain country or 
region that could possibly provoke an armed conflict, can international organisations, 
NGOs, and national governments plan coherent preventive interventions. Moreover, 
conflict early warning systems are the first instruments of prevention. Not only do they 
pave the way toward prevention, but they have preventive functions themselves. For 
instance, the decision to issue an early warning signal is an indication to the conflicting 
parties that their actions are being followed by outsiders and to third parties that 
preventive actions are needed [14]. Conflict early warning is a sort of tension meter 
from which it is possible to gauge the span of time that states and the international 
community have to sound the alarm and begin the process of prevention [2].  
When does one resort to early warning and conflict prevention? How does one 
decide the timing of prevention? According to a core definition, conflict prevention is 
“any structural or intercessory means to keep intrastate or interstate tensions and 
disputes from escalating into significant violence and use of armed force, to strengthen 
the capabilities of potential parties to violent conflict for resolving such disputes 
peacefully, and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that produce those 
 issues and disputes”[15]3. If we rely on this definition, thus implying that conflict 
prevention relates only to circumstances where violent conflict has not yet erupted, 
actions must be taken during the unstable peace phase, in which violence has not 
escalated but is characterised by tension and suspicion among parties. In this situation 
“[a] ‘negative peace’ prevails because, although armed forces are not deployed, the 
parties perceive one another as enemies and maintain deterrent military capabilities” 
[16]. Having an early warning signal in time to plan and implement a preventive 
strategy would be the ideal circumstances for the effective prevention of conflict. 
The above definition is nevertheless general and not exhaustive, since measures for 
conflict prevention, provided that they are suited to the events, can be taken until the 
very last moment before resorting to armed force, and used in post-conflict situations to 
prevent violence from occurring again. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing 
Deadly Conflict's 1997 report makes the distinction between structural prevention and 
operational prevention, according to the timing of the intervention. Structural or deep 
prevention takes into account the underlying relationships and clashing of interests 
among the actors, addressing either problems of international relations or internal 
issues of development, community relations and political culture [8]. Operational or 
light prevention does not necessarily address the root causes of a conflict but aims 
principally at preventing latent animosities from becoming armed conflicts. Systems 
for conflict early warning are a necessary condition for any strategy of conflict 
prevention and the specific type of preventive instruments that are chosen naturally 
differentiate according to the structural/deep or operational/light nature of preventive 
action4. 
Early warning systems may give different outputs according to the type of 
preventive intervention, either deep or light, that the systems themselves want to 
stimulate. Actions of deep prevention will be implemented where early warning 
systems have singled out proneness to chronic instability, but where violence is not 
imminent. In such cases, the objective is to address the root causes of conflicts. Thus 
the instruments used for preventive intervention consist of measures to promote good 
governance, wider economic opportunities, protection of human rights, and 
strengthened social relations. In these circumstances, international organisations have 
the opportunity to adopt a joint, cooperative strategy, using instruments such as 
international legal systems, dispute resolution mechanisms, and cooperative 
arrangements, which can minimise both external and internal threats to states’ security. 
For example, external security could be increased through the promotion of broader 
participation in and stronger commitment to the several existing arms control treaties, 
and through states' involvement in regional structures of cooperation, which would ease 
eventual problematic relations among neighbours. As for the development of internal 
security, this can be assisted by encouraging the adoption of internal norms and 
practices for governing interstate relations, avoiding and resolving disputes, and 
encouraging practices of good governance [17]. As a consequence of such a global 
approach, conflict prevention's aims broaden considerably, from simple avoidance of 
undesirable outcomes to the creation of preferred circumstances like security, well-
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 However, this does not mean that the two aspects of conflict prevention are clear-cut, since they define a 
continuum of activities undertaken at different points of a conflict's life cycle. 
 being and justice. These not only improve the condition of people’s lives but also 
reduce the potential for conflicts [18]. 
As far as the actions of operational or light prevention are concerned, they should 
be carried out according to early warning regarding the imminence of violence. 
Although in these circumstances the warning is better defined as “late” instead of early, 
there is still manoeuvring room to prevent mass violence. In these cases tools range 
from preventive diplomacy and economic measures such as inducements or sanctions, 
to the deployment of troops.  
In the face of a possible crisis, preventive diplomacy should be implemented 
together with traditional diplomacy. The situation requires urgent efforts from 
ambassadors, special envoys, senior Foreign Office officials to exert pressure and 
mediate to avoid the eruption of violence between opposing parties. Furthermore, 
instruments of preventive diplomacy such as bilateral negotiations, third party informal 
diplomatic consultations, track-two diplomacy, and third party mediation, are all suited 
to the involvement of non-governmental actors such as NGOs and private individuals5.  
Economic measures such as inducements and sanctions can be used to influence 
potential belligerents not to resort to force. Although the effectiveness of sanctions in 
preventing mass violence is in doubt [18], sanctions can have an important deterrent 
effect. They are especially useful as a signal to the offending state that more drastic 
actions can be taken if the situation does not improve, including the use of force if 
necessary. It is important, however, to make sure that economic sanctions are part of a 
broader strategy aimed at putting maximum political and economic pressure on the 
offending party. The sanctions should be targeted as much as possible at the body 
directly responsible, in order to avoid severe consequences for the population. As for 
inducements, these can take many forms. They can be political, enhancing a 
government's political standing (e.g. a visit by a foreign president, or political cover for 
difficult domestic choices); they can be social, providing a country with symbols of 
status or prestige (e.g., hosting the Olympics or obtaining a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council); and they can also be personal, appealing to a particular leader or 
leaders. By themselves, inducements rarely alter state behaviour. However, they can 
have a powerful effect if integrated into an overall strategy that makes countries feel 
they have a stake in complying with international regimes and practices6. 
Although it might seem contradictory to consider the use of military means for 
preventing armed conflicts, the deployment of armed forces can be necessary when 
diplomatic responses prove insufficient to avoid violence. The experience of the first 
UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia in 1992 is a good 
example of the use of preventive military response rather than diplomatic means, by 
positioning troops between disputing parties. Its effectiveness suggests the potential 
preventive value of such an instrument. It should not be seen as a last resort in 
circumstances of exceptional gravity, especially when certain conditions are present,  
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 In addition to economic sanctions and inducements, states and international organisations have other 
economic measures at their disposal, such as conditionality and dispute resolution mechanisms of 
international trade organisations [18].  
 such as a relatively low degree of tension, a clear mandate, cooperation with regional 
and non-governmental organisations, and the support of political parties and society.  
If we accept that prevention is possible throughout a conflict's whole life cycle (by 
using one or more of the aforementioned preventive tools according to the situation's 
characteristics), we assume also that early warning has a role to play not only in the 
pre-conflict phase of crises, but also in the intra-conflict and post-conflict phases as 
well. In fact, categorising prevention and early warning as early stage activities, and 
conflict resolution as a final stage activity, does not reflect reality [1]. Our assumption 
is even more valid considering that there are several entry points for early warning and 
conflict prevention in the whole evolution of a conflict. In fact, notwithstanding the 
usual representation of conflicts as sequences of phases, conflicts are not one-
dimensional and they unfold in a disjunctive, rather than linear, manner. Moreover, a 
conflict is also made up of the actors’ goals, interests and internal conditions, which 
offer additional opportunities for intervening within the conflict dynamics. Then, the 
multiplicity of levels among which the conflict moves must be considered: individual, 
group, region, state and international levels are dynamically connected and 
interventions at each of these levels can help prevent the spillover of violence. In other 
words, we have to pay attention not just to means, but also to causes and objectives. In 
this way we can design early warning and conflict prevention strategies that reveal both 
the underlying structural sources of conflict and the dynamics of conflict processes[1].  
“In the pre-conflict phase preventive strategies are primarily internal and non-
coercive, relying on bargaining between the main parties to the dispute. Ideally this 
means that the parties institutionalize a process or create mechanisms that permit a 
mutual dialogue to address their long-term relationship and transform the root causes of 
the conflict” [1]. There is no doubt that preventive actions in the pre-conflict phase 
involve mainly the parties to the potential conflict, and require their strong commitment 
to reciprocal dialogue. However, it is erroneous to say that this process is exclusively 
internal. In these circumstances, external intervention is needed to create either the 
ground for dialogue or better conditions of social equity and economic development, in 
order to ease grievances and dissatisfaction. Also, at this stage third parties may be 
needed to help create institutional venues for addressing the root causes of the crisis, 
especially when all the pre-conditions for escalating into conflict, although latent, are 
in place. Of course, the importance of an external presence increases as we move to the 
intra-conflict phase, when the opportunities for an internal settlement are extremely 
low. At this point, early warning systems should be able to identify the limits that 
parties would be ready to cross to escalate the war and try to reach their objectives. 
This type of warning would provide the opportunity to plan an external intervention in 
order to prevent the escalation of war. In the post-conflict phase, when early warning 
should be used to alert of any breakdown in the peace-building process that could cause 
a resume of violence, both internal and external involvement are needed. In fact, 
reconstruction and reconciliation need both the commitment of the war-torn society and 
political and economic assistance from international entities in order to be successful. 
“By definition, preventive action is a response to warnings” [19]. However, one 
should ask if this is a response to any kind of warning or only to warnings that have a 
certain format. Is unstructured information an early warning per se, assuming that it is 
available in time to fuel preventive action? Also, could international organisations’ or 
foreign ministries’ experts in particular countries or regions be considered an 
 appropriate source of advice and warnings on problematic areas at risk of violence? 
Monitoring what is going on in twenty to thirty countries of the world enables experts 
to give a summary of what is happening in one of those countries at a certain point in 
time. However, it is unrealistic to expect them to be able to keep track of how events 
and conditions are unfolding and foresee with a certain degree of confidence that 
something bad will happen in one, two, or six months [20]. Furthermore, is an alert 
issued by fieldworkers of an international NGO credible enough to cause governments 
and international organisations to act? Prevention failures and successes during the 
1990s have shown that no rule exists yet for deciding whether or not to intervene 
preventively. The experiences of Rwanda and Kosovo are usually reported as an 
example of lack of will to intervene in the face of very worrisome alarms from 
international workers in the field about the likelihood of mass violence and murder. On 
the contrary, the success of UNPREDEP in Macedonia has been achieved through 
smoother processes of preventive diplomacy, established well before signals of 
instability became alarming. Definitely, the international community's contrasting 
conduct is related to the evident difficulties in making prevention acceptable to 
decision makers, especially in situations when there are no direct third parties’ interests 
at stake and there is no certainty that the foreseen conflict will erupt. However, this also 
has to do with the lack of systematic early warning systems [4]7 that are able to foresee 
the imminence of a specific violent crisis and its expected consequences, and to 
indicate strategic options for an effective intervention. 
In fact, notwithstanding the impressive amount of information accessible to the 
public and the existence of many agencies and organisations that maintain early 
warning systems, the art of early warning is far from mastered [3]. Though much has 
been done regarding the collection of information, the systematic analysis of that 
information and the formulation of appropriate strategic choices must be further 
improved. It is true that warnings did exist about ethnic rivalry in Rwanda and Kosovo, 
but historical and current information was probably not properly used. 
 
3. The Early Warning Impulse and Conflict Prevention's Evolution 
After international organisations regained the main responsibility for multilateral 
conflict management, throughout the 1990s many statements and official documents 
were devoted in international fora to the concepts of early warning and conflict 
prevention. Although only in recent years have such ideas started to be streamlined into 
operational processes, the incubation period during which early warning and conflict 
prevention were debated has been indispensable for giving these concepts with broader 
international recognition. 
Furthermore, the rediscovered centrality of conflict prevention in the mandate of 
the UN has been of fundamental importance. The central role of the UN and its bodies 
in implementing the objective of prevention [23] is clearly stated in the UN Charter. 
Article 1, paragraph 1, establishes that a principal purpose of the UN is “to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace”. 
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 Article 2, paragraph 5, makes a minor reference to prevention by saying that all 
Member States are requested “to refrain from giving assistance to any state against 
which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action”. Instead, the UN 
Security Council preventive mandate is implicitly stated in Article 34, which authorises 
this body to “investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international 
friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the 
dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security”. This article, which has been the legal and political basis of inquiry and fact-
finding missions, clearly affirms that the Security Council can use its power long 
before a situation has erupted into an open international crisis. Also, in addition to 
giving the Security Council general responsibility for the prevention of crises, the 
charter grants the Security Council significant freedom in choosing the means for 
positively affecting the behaviour of parties to a potential conflict. Article 40 states, 
inter alia, that “[i]n order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security 
Council, may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures 
provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such 
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable”. The fact that the 
aforementioned provisional measures can be taken prior to or even without the 
determination under Article 39 gives the Security Council unlimited leeway for actual 
preventive action well beyond the letter of the Charter. 
This overview of the charter provisions demonstrates the existence of an adequate 
legal framework ensuring that the UN system and the Security Council are fully 
entitled to and equipped for conflict prevention. In fact, after a period of constrained 
ability in preventive missions, which were perceived by the superpowers as illicit 
interference, the end of the Cold War marked the reactivation of the Security Council 
with the launching of a number of new peacekeeping operations and a strong interest in 
recommitting the UN to the purposes and principles of the charter. The Security 
Council Summit of 31 January 1992 (the first at head of state or government level) 
marked the highest peak of confidence in the UN to regain the role envisaged by the 
charter for the maintenance of international peace, also through the conflict prevention.  
The answer to the expectations raised at that Summit is the well-known 1992 
report “An Agenda For Peace”, presented by the UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali. It is a milestone in the explicit recognition of the need for conflict 
prevention and of the UN's central role in achieving it. The report acknowledges that 
one of the organisation's fundamental aims is “[t]o seek to identify at the earliest 
possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to 
remove the sources of danger before violence results” [24]. In particular, preventive 
diplomacy is presented as the instrument to be used in order to “prevent disputes from 
arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and 
to limit the spread of the latter when they occur”. It is described as requiring 
confidence-building measures, early warning based on information gathering and 
informal or formal fact-finding and, if necessary, preventive deployment and 
demilitarised zones. In the light of the prevention concept's evolution since 1992, it is 
too limited today to equate conflict prevention with preventive diplomacy. Actually, 
preventive diplomacy is just one of the tools of conflict prevention, which range from 
economic assistance and development cooperation to human rights promotion and 
military deployment. Nevertheless, the views and proposals made by the Secretary-
General on the prevention of conflicts were significant, if only for the changes they 
 forecasted in multilateral conflict management and the endorsement they obtained by 
UN Member States. Furthermore, it was in pursuit of the proposals of “An Agenda for 
Peace” that steps were taken to develop an early warning mechanism within the UN 
[25]. 
In the years after this initial commitment to the principle of conflict prevention, a 
number of pronouncements, debates and guidelines were issued, not only by UN bodies 
but also by other international organisations. Within the United Nations, two public 
debates were organised on the subject by the Security Council in November 1999 and 
July 2000. At these debates, the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan stressed the need 
to move “from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention”  and the importance of 
addressing conflicts' deep-rooted causes such as “poverty, repression and undemocratic 
government and endemic underdevelopment, weak or non-existent institutions, 
political and economic discrimination between ethnic or religious communities”  [26]. 
Suggestions for steps to be taken by the Council for an effective prevention policy 
ranged from “making greater use of fact-finding missions; encouraging States to bring 
potential conflicts to the attention of the Council; and establishing an informal working 
group or a subsidiary organ to study early warning and prevention” [27] in order to 
revitalise those “Charter’s provisions relating to prevention [that] have been under-
utilized” [27]. Attention was called also on the room for action offered by the closer 
interaction with “non-State actors that have expertise in prevention or can make a 
difference to it” [27], such as civil society.  
The report on the prevention of armed conflicts issued in June 2001 by the 
Secretary-General represents a review of the progress achieved in developing the 
conflict prevention capacity of the United Nations, and gives recommendations on how 
the efforts of the United Nations system in this field could be further enhanced. The 
UN Secretary-General, by proposing ten principles which, in his view, should guide the 
United Nations' future approach to conflict prevention, explores the specific 
contributions that can be made by the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic 
and Social Council, International Court of Justice and Secretary-General as well as by 
the cooperation between the United Nations and outside actors, such as regional 
organisations, NGOs, civil society and the business community. The report recalls the 
well-known concept of a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention that must 
encompass “both short-term and long-term political, diplomatic, humanitarian, human 
rights, developmental, institutional and other measures taken by the international 
community, in cooperation with national and regional actors”, but it is far from being 
rhetorical. Indeed, it highlights two significant and often ignored concepts. First, it 
underlines that the UN's major challenge is to find out “how to mobilize the collective 
potential of the United Nations system with greater coherence and focus for conflict 
prevention, without necessarily requiring major new resources”, meaning that there is a 
need to exploit the preventive potential of the developmental programmes and projects 
which are already in place. Second, it highlights that “[t]he time has come to translate 
the rhetoric of conflict prevention into concrete action” by means of sustained political 
will and long-term commitment of resources by both Member States and the United 
Nations as a system [28]. 
Reactions within the UN system to this document were immediate. Security 
Council Resolution 1366 of 30 August 2001 articulates the Security Council’s 
complete endorsement of the views expressed by the Secretary-General in his report. It 
 significantly pledges intervention by expressing “its commitment to take early and 
effective action to prevent armed conflict and to that end to employ all appropriate 
means at its disposal including, with the consent of the receiving States, its missions to 
areas of potential conflict”. It grants the Secretary-General’s request by urging Member 
States to “provide the necessary human, material and financial resources for timely and 
preventive measures including early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive 
deployment, practical disarmament measures and peace-building as appropriate in each 
case”. More specifically the Security Council makes explicit reference to the need for 
enhancing the conflict prevention capacity of regional organisations, in particular in 
Africa. In addition, it refers to extending “international assistance to, inter alia, the 
Organization of African Unity8 and its successor organisation, through its Mechanism 
of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, as well as to the Economic 
Community of West African States and its Mechanism for Prevention, Management 
and Resolution of Conflicts, Peacekeeping and Security”. 
Since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1366, the important evolution of 
conflict prevention at normative, political and institutional levels has resulted in the 
adoption of other noteworthy UN documents. These reaffirm the centrality of conflict 
prevention in the maintenance of international peace and security, and the instrumental 
role of early warning tools, while confirming the approach of the Secretary-General’s 
2001 Report for implementing responsibilities9. 
Moreover, in 2002, at the request of the General Assembly, a review process was 
initiated for both UN conflict prevention capacities and opportunities for strengthening 
them. It made the United Nations system as a whole consider the mandates of all its 
agencies, funds and programmes through a prevention lens 10 . In fulfilling this 
mandated capacity review, the former Secretary-General issued a second 
comprehensive report on the prevention of armed conflict. The 2006 Progress Report 
on the Prevention of Armed Conflict notes that the culture of prevention which was 
invoked at the beginning of the new century is beginning to take hold at the UN. It 
states that “Member States have also begun to advance the indispensable notion of 
national infrastructures of peace and to clarify what external support is needed”. Five 
years after the UN's first reflection ever on the prevention of armed conflict, the 2006 
Report takes the debate forward and shifts attention from mandates and responsibilities 
to awareness of what is to be prevented and through which instruments. Thus, it creates 
some hope that developing and making effective international and national mechanisms 
for preventing violent conflicts has been accepted as a shared responsibility. 
The existence of an established role for early warning mechanisms is confirmed by 
the wording of the aforementioned UN documents. Early warning, along with 
preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, practical disarmament measures and 
post-conflict peace-building, is counted among the “interdependent and complementary 
components of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy” (UN Security Council 
Resolution 1366 (2001)). 
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 As already mentioned, other international organisations besides the UN have been 
paying increased attention to the issue of conflict prevention since the early 1990s.  
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)'s strong 
engagement in the sphere of conflict prevention is the consequence of adopting a 
comprehensive concept of security, that relates the maintenance of peace to the respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to economic and environmental 
solidarity and cooperation. The Helsinki Summit Declaration of 1992 expresses the 
recognition by OSCE Member States that the prevention of conflicts in the OSCE area 
is directly affected by the implementation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
the development and support of democratic institutions, and by the protection of 
minorities and the upholding of the rule of law [29]. The OSCE approach's originality 
consists in its consideration of the human dimension (for example, respecting the whole 
range of human rights and fundamental freedoms), as the military dimension's 
necessary complement in identifying potential tension and conflicts both within and 
between states [30]. Also, from the point of view of institutional capacities for 
preventing conflict, the OSCE is very advanced. Its Office of the High Commissioner 
on National Minorities, Centre for Conflict Prevention headquarters and its field 
missions are involved in monitoring and fact-finding tasks as well as in more structural 
preventive activities [31]. 
As for the European Union, in the last decade it has officially committed to the 
principles of conflict prevention. Within such a short period of time, the EU has 
managed to achieve significant results in the implementation of a coherent approach. In 
fact, with the Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention (April 2001) and the 
EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (June 2001), the EU offered 
concrete recommendations for reform and a strategic outline in order to place conflict 
prevention at the heart of its policymaking [32]. In particular, with its Communication 
on Conflict Prevention [33], the European Commission launched an attempt to 
integrate most of the activities belonging to the field of conflict prevention into one 
policy concept, thus outlining its ideas on mainstreaming conflict prevention. In this 
document the Commission highlights how, by using the instruments at its disposal in 
conducting external relations, the EU has the opportunity to develop a comprehensive 
strategy to address the many sources of violent conflict. On the one hand, development 
policy and other cooperation programmes provide the most powerful instruments for 
addressing all aspects of structural stability in counties at risk in a long-term and 
integrated perspective. On the other hand, in the face of imminent crises and conflicts, 
the EU has the potential to react quickly by using both traditional instruments like 
political dialogue and special representatives, as well as dedicated and accessible 
financial instruments like the new Instrument for Stability that is “able to provide more 
flexible and rapid assistance in response to pre- and post-crisis situations, 
complementing and kick-starting efforts that are being undertaken under the more long-
term community instruments” [34].  
The EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, adopted by the 
Göteborg European Council on 15 and 16 June 2001, represents the Member States’ 
“political commitment to pursue conflict prevention as one of the main objectives of 
the EU external relations” [35]11 . The specific objectives are being systematically 
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 monitored by implementation reports12, and include setting clear political priorities for 
preventive actions; improving early warning, action and policy coherence; enhancing 
instruments for long- and short-term prevention; and building effective partnerships for 
prevention. Such a programme is more than an overview of the principle inspiring the 
EU strategy on conflict prevention; it is a listing of operational and political activities 
that needs to be implemented with the fundamental commitment of the EU Member 
States. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
traditionally put great emphasis on conflict prevention for the reduction of poverty and 
helping sustainable development. In particular the 1997 OECD/DAC 13  guidelines, 
“Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century”, 
were envisaged to shape the design and implementation of development cooperation 
for conflict prevention in post-conflict recovery. The supplement to that work, 
“Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners”, which was 
approved in April 2001 [36], addressed some new challenges and changes. The 
organisation has attained paramount importance to the relationship between security 
and development, strengthening peace processes, building partnerships with states and 
civil society actors, and working with the private sector to promote growth and avoid 
fuelling violence. It also has been at the forefront in promoting the mainstreaming of 
conflict prevention into policy formulation and paying early attention to risk factors 
through early warning tools. While the guidelines focused primarily on addressing the 
roots of violent conflicts through long-term structural preventive measures integrated 
into development programmes, the recent OECD/DAC report on conflict early warning 
and response [37] also tries to foster tools for operational prevention. The report is 
aimed at helping the integration of conflict early warning analysis and response into 
states' programming. 
4. From Early Warning Ideas to Early Warning Systems 
The concept of conflict early warning has deeply evolved since its first appearance as 
one of the prerequisites of an international post-Cold War conflict management system. 
Although the first study about the application of social science research to the 
development of early warning indicators for conflict forecasting was published in 1979 
[38] 14 , theoretical work and definition of practical instruments for early warning 
advanced rapidly only in the very last two decades. Leading up to the 1990s, the actual 
practice of early warning, other than for military purposes, was almost totally restricted 
to the prevention of humanitarian disasters [39]. 
The main aspect stressed at the very beginning of this evolution was the 
information gathering feature. In fact, in order to predict the outbreak of a conflict, 
information is needed about its main features on the one hand, and the situation at risk 
on the other hand. Information gathered on the field, collected and released, was 
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 initially considered sufficient for signaling an impending escalation of violence and 
motivating preventive intervention. Similarly, early warning was also viewed in terms 
of information sharing, emphasising again the importance of data gathering. Simply 
having a constantly-updated database on regions in danger of conflict, whose data were 
disseminated among interested agencies, was considered sufficient as an early warning 
system 15 . This approach was enabled by the significant increase in information 
collection and dissemination capacities since the mid-1980s, thanks to electronic 
networking, widespread availability of personal computers and advances in technology 
for data management and analysis. However, today it appears too simplistic, as it 
reduces early warning to a mere smoke alarm system. Especially after the international 
community's failures in preventing humanitarian emergencies during the 1990s both in 
“peripheral” African countries and in inner Europe, it has been clear that early warning 
goes beyond the collection and sharing of information. In fact, it is vital that both the 
analysis of the information, and formulation of appropriate strategic choices based on 
that analysis, are included [4]. Analysis is indeed the essential component to 
monitoring, since it provides risk assessments, that are fundamental complements to 
reliable information and help decision makers devise optimal preventive measures for 
each crisis situation. A comparison among the three main approaches to early warning 
highlights the importance of interpreting the available information in a way that 
ensures appropriate responses to early warning signals. 
As mentioned above, early warning can be understood as field monitoring. This 
accepted meaning was traditionally associated with reports given by diplomats and 
local representatives of international organisations to account for any event or 
information pointing to an imminent escalation of conflict. Such type of monitoring 
and reporting was of great potential value, due to the high quality and immediacy of the 
information generated. For this reason, it has been used for decades by many NGOs 
and UN agencies concerned with humanitarian issues [40]. However, despite these 
advantages, this kind of early warning was unable to directly identify conflict risks 
unless subsequent synthesis and assessment were conducted separately16. 
In the early 1990s, the discussion of conflict early warning systems focused on 
using indicators for risk assessment. The basic idea was that indicators, rather than 
unstructured data, would allow policy makers to confront situations with appropriate 
model data. Although this approach was valuable, because it systematised information 
and made it immediately available, it had two main drawbacks. First, indicators are 
more suitable for tracking country situations than for anticipating changes, as they 
describe event backgrounds, rather than events themselves [4]. Second, indicators can 
surely help decision makers regulate the flow of information they receive, but do not 
give them the filters they need for screening and interpreting it.  
A third interpretation of early warning is the development of explicit models used 
for the interpretation of available information. Early warning systems of this nature use 
indicators as a starting point. Models then “identify which measurable conditions, in 
what combination and relative importance establish a potential for which kind of crisis” 
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 [4]. These models identify the type of crisis, specify the combinations of risk factors 
and sequences of events likely to lead to crisis, and distinguish between structural 
conditions and dynamic intervening factors. They therefore allow planning of both 
long- and short-term responses. 
It is this systematic, model-based early warning that is nowadays considered the 
most reliable instrument for both anticipating and responding to humanitarian crises 
and violent conflicts. In fact, today most academic researchers, dedicated national and 
international agencies, and NGOs, agree on a complex concept of early warning, made 
up of three, equally essential main components. Accordingly, FEWER17's definition of 
early warning is “the collection and analysis of information about potential and actual 
conflict situations, and the provision of policy options to influential actors at the 
national, regional and international levels that may promote sustainable peace” [41]. 
Early warning is therefore not only the communication of information about a crisis 
(the first element), but is also the analysis of that information (the second element), and 
the development of potential, timely, strategic response options (the third element) [4].  
According to this view, a conflict forecasting system should build upon three 
keywords: understanding, anticipation and intervention. Understanding means to 
develop theoretical knowledge about the causes and dynamics of conflict18 or, in other 
words, to know about its root causes and conditions. Anticipation means to recognise 
patterns of events and actions leading to potential crises. Intervention, or the indication 
of potential moments and fields for action, should be the result of both understanding 
and anticipation [43]. Early warning systems should not be simple mechanisms that 
provide alerts, but broader institutional and procedural environments that take early 
warning alerts, process them, and bring them to the attention of the appropriate 
individuals and organisations [20]. The key concept is the transformation of the early 
warning idea into early warning systems, composite tools that help interpret 
information on a global scale, not just unstructured reports flowing from the field.  
5. Applying Forecasting Methods to the Set Up of Early Warning Models 
When entering the territory of forecasting we must first avoid the common mistake of 
confusing prophecies with scientific forecasts. The former assumes that fate exists, and 
events are predestined; the latter derives logically from theories and models aiming to 
explain reality, and is influenced by probability. Despite mistakes that may occur, 
forecasting is of fundamental importance for decision making processes, since there is 
no strategic planning without scientific forecasting [44]. This holds true not only in 
technology but in the social sciences, even though the anticipation of political, 
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 economic and social events is more uncertain, since it is influenced by human volition 
and preferences.  
Within the social sciences, forecasting has largely been the domain of economists. 
However, the virtual explosion in ethnic violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
coupled with decades of quantitative research on the causes of collective violence, have 
generated enthusiasm for forecasting political and humanitarian crises [45]. Although it 
is commonly considered impossible to forecast exact outcomes of social events, the 
development of early warning models19 has been identified as the most appropriate 
instrument for attempting a scientific anticipation of violent conflicts. A foundation in 
science is fundamental, since too many inaccurate early warnings can jeopardise the 
credibility of all early warning research [46]. Issuing an alarm for a situation that 
doesn't escalate into violence (false positive) is as discrediting as not giving any signal 
for a conflict that does (false negatives)20.  
Existing forecasting techniques can be classified into two broad categories: data-
based and judgment-based models. Data-based forecasting requires the collection of 
large data sets (either over time and/or over a cross-section of cases), and statistical 
data analysis. In contrast, for expert-based methods, the main emphasis is not on the 
collection of data or their systematic analysis, but on experts' subjective assessment, 
based on relatively less specific methodology. 
Conflict early warning systems commonly make use of data-based models. Data 
are used to build the model, and to fill the parameters of the developed model in order 
to make specific predictions. In the first case, the data come from substantive 
knowledge about the humanitarian crisis or type of conflict being studied. In the second 
case, the data derive from analysis of the current situation being monitored, according 
to the model's instructions.  
The models most commonly used for early warning purposes have been 
categorised by Gurr and Harff into three types: correlational models, sequential models 
and conjunctural models [42].  
Correlational models belong to the family of causal models, and more broadly to 
the econometric method of forecasting, which involves the development of detailed 
statistical models. Like causal models, correlational models attempt to explain the 
future by identifying causal factors and possible relationships with the future21. The 
correlational model approach is based on the assumption that certain indicators, or 
measures of the political, economic and social situation in a country, co-vary with the 
measured level of violence there. More radically, it assumes that the variables 
represented by those indicators cause the level of violence.  
Causal analysis requires the analyst to specify the causal linkages that bind the 
dependent variable with a set of independent variables. “On the right hand side of the 
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 equation are the indicators believed to contribute to the likelihood of whether a 
situation will become a violent conflict or not in the not-too-distant future. On the left-
hand-side is the outcome indicator with values such as conflict or no conflict or close to 
a conflict or possibly some more precise measure of the level of violence. […] If the 
values of the indicators on the right-hand-side of the equation reach values such that 
the calculated value of the outcome (at the left-hand-side of the equation) corresponds 
to a violent conflict, there then exists a reasonable basis for a conflict alert” [49]. While 
this method is useful for identifying universal and specific causal connections and their 
relative importance, it has two major drawbacks for the purpose of conflict early 
warning. First, since causal relations change over time, it needs to be re-estimated 
periodically using new data. Second, because it takes into account only background 
conditions and not the immediate precipitants of conflict, it does not help identify entry 
points for policy changes or external engagement [42] [47]. For the same reason, the 
results of this type of model should be regarded as risk assessments and not forecasts. 
Sequential models describe how an environmental change determines the 
occurrence of a specific event or a change in a specified variable. For example, where a 
basic correlational model would explain a certain level of violence as a function of the 
unemployment rate, a basic sequential model would explain violence as a consequence 
of changes in society produced by the unemployment rate. Such changes could be 
expressed as the increase in discontent among workers, fuelled in turn by a rise in the 
price of bread [47]. One of the most important features of this approach is that the 
element of time is explicitly involved. This model is therefore much better suited to 
tracking crisis situations as they evolve over time than correlational models [42].  
In addition to background and intervening conditions, the model includes so-called 
accelerators. These are defined as special events outside the system parameters that, 
when they occur, rapidly increase the level or significance of the most volatile general 
conditions. By activating or inactivating relationships between different elements of the 
model, as well as by changing the pace or dynamic of such relationships, accelerators 
initiate a cascade of events that tend to trigger episodes of massive violence. Because 
of these characteristics, a computer simulation is the most appropriate tool for 
sequential model implementation. “A computer simulation directly corresponds to a 
sequential model. The unique feature of computer simulations is that they step through 
the sequence of steps in an accelerated manner inside the computer. […] It is through 
this accelerated movement through time that a sequential model implemented in a 
computer can provide an early warning of violent conflicts. As the model simulates the 
situation between or within countries, the model can, in effect, get to the future before 
the 'real world' gets there” [49].  
Conjunctural models have only recently been theoretically investigated [49], after 
an initial operational approach was presented in 1994 at the International Workshop on 
Early Warning of Communal Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises at the University of 
Maryland [42]. As their name implies, conjunctural models focus on conjunctions or 
combinations of conditions and events that lead to violent conflicts. The fundamental 
assumption is that different combinations of events or circumstances lead to different 
outcomes. While correlational models start from the premise that explanatory 
(independent) variables co-vary with the output or dependent variable, and that 
explanatory variables are independent from each other, conjunctural models consider 
the particular combination or configuration of indicators (independent variables) and 
 violent conflict (dependent variable) to be the key feature of their relationship. What is 
important here is interaction among indicators and not the idea that they are 
independent [49] [50]. Brecke's approach to applying this model to conflict early 
warning is to use pattern recognition techniques to identify particular configurations of 
conditions (or conjunctions of indicator values) that precede the outbreak of violent 
conflicts consistently, historically and for a number of countries [49] [51].  
Our analysis above has concentrated mainly on the objective methods of 
forecasting, as their advantages are fairly obvious. When we are dealing with a large 
amount of data, the underlying relationships among them are often unclear to a casual 
observer. Thus, statistical methods can provide us with precise quantitative estimates of 
the relative and absolute impact of independent variables on dependent variables. On 
the other hand, subjective methods are best suited to describe the socio-cultural 
dynamics associated with political events barely captured by econometric modelling. 
However, subjective models have their shortcomings. When forecasts are conducted on 
the basis of subjective assessment, they are likely to be influenced by the forecaster’s 
prejudices, preconceived ideas, ideology and self-interest. According to this reasoning, 
and bearing in mind that predictive efficiency is a relative concept, the combining of 
forecasting techniques suggested by Gupta, quoting Peter Kennedy (1987), seems a 
good idea: “[i]n general, research has indicated that the ‘best’ forecast is one formed as 
an average of a variety of forecasts, each generated by a completely different technique. 
If the principles on which these different forecasts are based are sufficiently different 
from one another, an average (or a weighted average, if more confidence is placed in 
some of these forecasts than others) of these forecasts, called an amalgamated forecast, 
could prove superior to any single forecasting technique” [45]. 
The technical discussion above, about the objective and subjective methods of 
forecasting, has been expressed in the current debate on conflict early warning in terms 
of quantitative vs. qualitative analytical tools. 
Quantitative tools are mainly forecasting models and structural analogy methods 
aimed at collecting and analysing structural and/or events-based data about a 
potential/actual conflict situation on the basis of indicator-based models. These tools 
and methods have proven highly predictive, particularly those related to political crisis 
and instability, and of immediate policy value in terms of setting policy priorities and 
identifying watch lists of potential crises. However, they provide decision makers with 
little insight into what is happening on the ground or what needs to be done, and are 
therefore more useful for assessing risks than for identifying appropriately targeted 
preventive measures22. The strengths and weaknesses of these models have led to the 
development of conflict early warning systems that apply a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative methods.  
Qualitative methods for conflict analysis were developed in the second half of the 
1990s, as tools for better understanding violent conflicts and responses to them [53]. 
Qualitative methods provide rich contextual information and analysis, are more easily 
adaptable to planning processes within institutional settings and are usually designed to 
take stakeholders’ views into account. However, significant limitations prevented their 
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 exclusive and autonomous use within early warning systems. They tend to oversimplify 
the complexity of violent conflicts, apply technical solutions to complex political issues 
and rely too heavily on the personal judgment of the  analyst.  
As concluded by the OECD's 2009 report, “there is no 'best methodology' […]. 
There is basic good practice in quantitative and qualitative analysis and a range of 
methods draw on this. These are designed to serve the interests of their target 
institution. […T]he best approach is to combine quantitative and qualitative tools, and 
sometimes to combine different sets of quantitative methods. This ensures the 
necessary triangulation required for creating a robust evidence base for decision 
making” [53].   
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